This is not an Amanda bug, but it may affect those who are using
encryption or certificates with Amanda on Debian or Debian derived
systems (Ubuntu, etc), so I thought I would pass it along.
---------------
Chris Hoogendyk
-
O__ ---- Systems Administrator
c/ /'_ --- Biology & Geology Departments
(*) \(*) -- 140 Morrill Science Center
~~~~~~~~~~ - University of Massachusetts, Amherst
<hoogendyk AT bio.umass DOT edu>
---------------
Erdös 4
-------- Original Message --------
Subject: Debian predictable random number generator
Date: Thu, 15 May 2008 10:47:54 -0400
Scope: Anyone using cryptographic keys from a Debian derivative OS
(Ubuntu included, etc). This weakness is present both on servers running
Debian variants as well as servers that users connect to from
Debian-based workstations.
Impact: It is claimed that there are only 65k weak keys to be brute
forced. The logging on failed shared key authentication attempts is weak
in many log configurations. As such, there is a substantial exposure
presented here. There are already multiple publicly available tools that
can exploit this weakness.
Solution: Check with your distribution for details. Some common
references below.
http://www.debian.org/security/
http://www.ubuntu.com/usn
Details:
From: http://www.debian.org/security/2008/dsa-1571
"Luciano Bello discovered that the random number generator in Debian's
openssl package is predictable. This is caused by an incorrect
Debian-specific change to the openssl package (CVE-2008-0166). As a
result, cryptographic key material may be guessable.
This is a Debian-specific vulnerability which does not affect other
operating systems which are not based on Debian. However, other systems
can be indirectly affected if weak keys are imported into them.
It is strongly recommended that all cryptographic key material which has
been generated by OpenSSL versions starting with 0.9.8c-1 on Debian
systems is recreated from scratch. Furthermore, all DSA keys ever used
on affected Debian systems for signing or authentication purposes should
be considered compromised; the Digital Signature Algorithm relies on a
secret random value used during signature generation.
The first vulnerable version, 0.9.8c-1, was uploaded to the unstable
distribution on 2006-09-17, and has since that date propagated to the
testing and current stable (etch) distributions. The old stable
distribution (sarge) is not affected.
Affected keys include SSH keys, OpenVPN keys, DNSSEC keys, and key
material for use in X.509 certificates and session keys used in SSL/TLS
connections. Keys generated with GnuPG or GNUTLS are not affected, though."
|
