On Mon, 7 Nov 1994 10:05:38 PST Paul L. Bradshaw said:
>We are looking at encryption, but one of the key stumbling blocks is in the
>area of key management.
>Questions:
>1.  Should ADSM allow for keys to be changed on a time basis?

I don't see this as a requirement.

>2.  Should ADSM administrators set the keys and provide to end users, end
>    users only set the keys, a combination of above under admin control, etc?

Just admin control would be sufficient.

>3.  If keys are allowed to be changed, then is the user/site willing to
>    sign up for prompting the end user to enter key-1, key-2, ... key-n
>    for all files to be restored?

Ugh, only for data that has been encrypted.  I'm not wild about changing
keys, we don't even expire passwords though (although that wasn't my
decision).

>4.  Is encryption just needed for transmission and not storage?  ie:
>    encrypt the data over the wire with the session key, but decrypt it before
>    it is stored since the physical media is protected?  Are sites willing
>    to take the performance penalty for the dual encryption?

We would only need encryption for transmission.  I wouldn't want to decrypt
on the mainframe, even though we have secure data storage, because of the
performance hit.  Encryption would be nice, but we just enable all clients
with compression so that clear-text data isn't sent.  We seem to be more
concerned with network bandwith usage than security anyway.


University.

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Keith A. Crabb         Keith AT UH DOT EDU
Keith A. Crabb         Keith AT UH DOT EDU
University of Houston  Operating Systems Specialist +1-713-743-1530